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Abstract
This paper uses a sample of lone mothers (and former lone mothers who are now
repartnered) drawn from the 1997 Family Resources Survey to analyse the potential
effects of reforming the UK system of Child Support. The main deficiency of the data
is that non-resident fathers cannot be matched to the mothers in the data and this is
overcome by exploiting information from another dataset which gives the joint
distribution of the characteristics of separated parents. The effects of reforming the
Child Support system is simulated for the amount of maintenance liabilities, the
amount paid and the net incomes of households containing mothers with care and
households containing non-resident fathers. The likely effects of the reform are
simulated at various levels of compliance. The analysis highlights the need for further
research into the incentive effects of Child Support on individual behaviour.
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11. Introduction
Child support reform has attracted considerable attention in the UK, the US
and elsewhere in recent years. The original motivation for reform in both the UK and
the US came from the growing number of lone parents and their increasing reliance
on welfare payments. In spite of the importance of the issue, there is little research
that analyses the impact of child support reform on the level of child support paid or
on other aspects of behaviour. In the US, research reported in Garfinkel et al (1999a)
looks at the effects of child support on a variety of aspects of the behaviour of non-
resident fathers but has little to say about the simple distributional effects of reforms1.
In the UK, Bingley et al (1995, 1997), and Preston and Walker (1999) investigate the
impact that child support has on the labour supply behaviour of lone mothers through
its effect on the budget constraints that they face but are silent on child support
behaviour itself.
Widespread discontent with the way in which earlier UK reforms in 1993 have
worked has renewed pressure for further change and the government’s proposals are
now detailed in a recent White Paper (HMSO (1999)). The present  paper is a first
step towards analysing the effects of the proposed reforms against four central
objectives. First, to raise the degree of compliance of Child Support payments with
the level of assessed liability. Second, to shift some of the burden of support of the
children of lone mothers from benefit payments to the non-resident fathers. Third, to
reduce the work disincentives implicit in the current Child Support formula and the
associated Child Support disregards in the benefit system. Finally, and as a
consequence of the first three goals, to lower the incidence of poverty among children.
There are also important questions concerning the impact on other aspects of
behaviour, such as, fertility and partnership decisions, which are not directly
addressed here.2
The reform itself is complex and the effects on household net incomes reflect
the interactions between projected changes in child support payments and the welfare
system. This analysis is based on detailed modelling of the changes on recent sample
1 See also Hu (1999) for an analysis of the effects of child support on work incentives in the US.
Corden (1999) provides an outline comparison of child support systems across European countries.
2 These issues will be addressed in future work that is being funded directly by the Nuffield
Foundation.
2survey data that is reasonably representative of the population3. The principle data
source is a sample of lone mothers (and former lone mothers who are now
repartnered) drawn from the 1997 Family Resources Survey.4 The main deficiency of
the data is that it is not possible to match non-resident fathers to the mothers in the
data, but this is overcome by exploiting information from another survey on the joint
distribution of the characteristics of separated parents. The analysis also allows for
other important changes that are likely to affect the impact of the reform including the
recent imposition of a minimum wage and the extension of the main in-work transfer
programme (Family Credit, now known as Working Families’ Tax Credit).
We simulate the effects of the Child Support reforms on the size of
maintenance liabilities, the amount paid and the net incomes of both the household
containing the mother with care and the households containing the non-resident
father. Since the reform specifically aims to promote compliance, the likely effects of
changes in liability on compliance are examined. Another mechanism for promoting
compliance is to be a disregard for Child Support in the Income Support system,
which will give the parent with care a positive financial incentive to cooperate with
the CSA. The downside of such a disregard is that it may have adverse effects on
work incentives. Thus, in addition to looking at the impact on net incomes, the effect
of reform on work incentives is examined using a simple labour supply model.
The main conclusion is that compliance effects are likely to be very important.
The effects of the reform on child poverty are beneficial even though, on average,
Child Support liabilities fall unless this is offset by a considerable rise in compliance.
This result is driven by the removal in the reforms of any exemptions to making a
minimum payment and the introduction of an Income Support disregard which will
allow the majority of mothers with care (those receiving Income Support) to see some
gain in net income from Child Support payments.
3 The White Paper contains some predictions that have been obtained from applying the reforms to
administrative Child Support Agency data. While this administrative data provides information on the
non-resident father that is not available in the FRS data used here, the cases dealt with by the CSA are
not a random sample of all lone parents. For example, the CSA deals with all those cases where the
parent with care is on Income Support (or Housing Benefit or Family Credit) and those not on Income
Support who ask for the CSA’s assistance. Thus, it seems likely that the typical CSA client will have a
substantially lower level of Child Support entitlement than the average individual eligible for Child
Support.
32. The Reform
The contrast with the US is interesting. Since the 1996 welfare reforms in the
US, each state has been allowed to design its own child support system and states
have divided into two broad camps. In the income-shares camp, child support is a
proportion of the combined incomes of both natural parents. The current UK system
broadly falls into this category, with the liability of the non-resident parent prorated
between the parents according to each share of their combined incomes. In contrast,
the proposed reformed system falls into the percent-of-income camp where child
support is a percentage of the non-resident parent’s income with the percentage
varying with the number of children.
The existing system of child support is described in some detail in CPAG
(1999) and here their notation is used to facilitate comparison between our summary
exposition and the fine details. The steps in the formula can be compressed into the
following single relationship, which is broadly based around the “proposed amount”
(P) for the parent with care (PWC) and non-resident parent (NRP):
P = 0.5*F if F+G < 2A
P = c*F + (1 – 2*c)*A*(F /(F+G)) if F+G ³ 2A
where: F = D – B (= 0 if NRP or new partner on IS or JSA) where D = net income for
NRP, and B = exempt income for NRP; G = E – C (= 0 if PWC or new partner on IS,
JSA, DWA or WFTC) where E = net income for PWC and C = exempt income for
PWC; A = maintenance requirement; and c = 0.15, 0.20 and 0.25 for 1, 2 and 3 plus
qualifying children respectively. Since net income is set to zero for the listed benefit
recipients and also excludes several other types of benefits, it mainly captures net
earnings and investment income.5 Exempt income includes an allowance for
supporting qualifying and new children6 in the household, but this is reduced if a new
partner has sufficient income to help support any new children. Exempt income also
                                                                                                                                           
4 The number of lone fathers in the data who have custody of children is too small to facilitate reliable
statistical analysis.
5 It also includes the income of own children (qualifying or new).
6 Qualifying children are the natural children of the separated parents. New children are defined as
children of one of the parent and a new partner. Stepchildren are defined as natural children only of the
new partner of one of the parents.
4includes housing costs and travel-to-work costs. The maintenance requirement
depends on the number and ages of the qualifying children. Note that NRPs on IS or
JSA have a zero proposed amount.
In addition, the final liability (L) is subject to three separate maximums, partly
to ensure that non-resident parents are left with adequate resources to support
themselves and their families:
L = max ( P ,  J ,  0.3*D,  0.85 * (R – V) )
where:  J = maximum dependent on modified values of A, F and G; R = family
income for the NRP; and V = protected income for the NRP family. The family
income for the NRP includes all income except certain benefits for the NRP, any new
partner and any dependent children. The protected income includes an allowance for
family size and ages of children, housing costs, net council tax and travel-to-work
costs that ensures that the NRP is at least £30 better off than he would otherwise
receive on IS and HB. There is also a minimum liability of roughly 10% of the current
Income Support rate for a single person, which currently stands at £5.20 a week.
Those exempt from this minimum have a zero liability if L is below this minimum
and exemptions include all those NRPs with any dependent children in their new
household.7
To summarise the current system, liability depends primarily on the net
income of both natural parents. Exemptions from this income include allowances for
new children, which may be partially offset if the new partner has sufficiently high
income. For the NRP, the presence of stepchildren and the income of a new partner
also affect the maximum and minimum levels of liability.
The relationship between the liability and NRP income has three steps. At low
levels of income, the liability is fixed at the minimum or at zero depending upon
whether the NRP is exempt. Past the point where income is sufficiently high for L to
exceed £5.20, the liability rises at a rate of 50% with any additional income. If income
is higher than the point where the children’s needs are deemed to have been met
7 Exemptions include those NRPs with any dependent children in their new family, those receiving
certain disability benefits, those under the age of 16, those under the age of 19 and in full-time
education and those with net income below the minimum.
5(F+G ³ 2A), the liability rises at a lower rate with income to allow the children to
share in the good fortune of a high income non-resident parent. The income of the
PWC affects the liability only in the third of these steps and in determining the point
where the third step begins. The higher the income of the PWC, the lower the amount
of NRP income where the third step begins and the slower the increase in the liability
with NRP income in the step. Hence, increases in PWC income reduce the liability,
but in a non-linear fashion.8 The number of qualifying children influence the liability
both directly in the third step for NRP income and indirectly by increasing the exempt
income for the PWC. Finally, a rise in the NRP’s housing or travel-to-work costs
reduces the liability through its impact on exempt income. Similarly, a rise in the
PWC’s housing to travel to-work costs increases the liability. Hence, there are
incentives to increase spending on either of these items.
In contrast, the liability calculation proposed in the reform is simply a
proportion of the non-resident parent’s earnings:
L = d * N if N ³ £200
L = e * N if £100 < N < £200
L = £5 if N < £100
where: N = net earnings of NRP if there are no new or stepchildren, 0.85*(net
earnings of NRP) if there is 1 new or stepchild, 0.80*(net earnings of NRP) if there
are 2 new or stepchildren, 0.75*(net earnings of NRP) if there are 3 or more new or
stepchildren; and d = 0.15, 0.20 and 0.25 for 1, 2 and 3 plus qualifying children
respectively. In the case where there are no children in the second family e is 0.25,
0.35 or 0.45 of additional earnings if there are 1, 2 or 3 ore more qualifying children9.
There are no exemptions to the £5 minimum. The net earnings of the non-resident
parent include WFTC payments
In summary: under the proposed reformed system the liability depends only on
the NRP earnings, the number of qualifying children and the number of NRP’s new
and step children with a new partner. Any other information about the PWC is
8 In addition, the higher the PWC income, the lower the maximum liability level set in J.
9 When there are 1/2/3+ children in the second family then the e schedule is
0.205,0.29,0.375/0.19,0.27,0.35/0.175,0.25,0.325.
6ignored, as is any information about any new partner of the NRP. As in the current
system, the relationship between the liability and NRP income has three steps. At low
levels of earnings, it is constant at the minimum £5 payment. In the second step, the
liability increases at a rate of 25%, 35% or 45% with additional earnings if there are 1,
2 or 3 ore more qualifying children respectively.10  Above £200 of net earnings, the
liability rises at rates of 15%, 20% and 25% respectively. The reduction in the
percentage for second families allows the NRP to give marginally more support to
new and stepchildren. For example, with one qualifying child and one new child, 15%
of the NRP earnings is allowed for the new child and 12.75% (0.15*0.85) for the
qualifying child.11 Note that the formula makes no distinction between natural new
and stepchildren in the second family, whereas the current formula only allows for
new children, presumably on the grounds that stepchildren should be receiving
support from their non-resident parent.12
The way in which Child Support interacts with the tax and welfare system is
also important. A second major part of the reform deals with the benefit disregards for
receipt of Child Support. The White Paper proposes the introduction of a £10
disregard for Income Support and also proposes increasing the current Family Credit
disregard of £15 such that WFTC will disregard all child support payments no matter
how large. The White Paper indicates no change to the current £15 disregard in the
assessment for Housing Benefit.
There is no change proposed to the current tax treatment of Child Support
receipts and payments. Receipts are free from NI and tax liability. Child Support
payments qualify for tax relief for the non-resident parent if the parents are/were
married to each other. The tax relief is limited to the size of the married couple’s
allowance and currently operates at a rate of relief of 10%. The relief ceases if the
parent with care remarries.
10 These are the marginal rates within the second step bounds, but the average liability rate gradually
rises from 5% at £100 to the respective 15%, 20% or 25% at £200 of net earnings.
11 This is not to say that the NRP may not contribute more or less than the designated percentage to the
support of the new child.
12 Thus there is a “double-dividend” for stepchildren in the proposed reforms. Not only do the reforms
benefit second families with stepchildren by allowing this new reduction in liability but the increased
compliance and the removal of the PWC income from the liability calculation should raise the Child
Support received for them by the family.
73. The Objectives of Reform
One of the major objectives of the reform is to raise the degree of compliance
of Child Support payments closer to the level of assessed liability. The White Paper
suggests that “the new simpler rules, tougher sanctions and better enforcement of
maintenance will mean that at least 80% of maintenance due will be paid under the
new scheme”.13
The popular conception of the proposed reforms is that the present system
deters compliance because liability is determined by a complicated function of both
parents’ incomes and many other factors such as housing costs, the number of
children of the partnership, and any income of the non-resident parent’s new partner.
The reform is portrayed as replacing this complicated relationship by a simple linear
function of the non-resident parent’s income and the number of children in both
families. In fact, the reform also makes the relationship between liability and the non-
resident parent’s income non-linear, but the new formula requires less information
from both parents and involves only two mathematical operations14. Thus, it will be
easier for the parties concerned to understand how the liability has been determined
and easier for the CSA to determine the information required to make the
computation. In addition, the relative stability of the factors entering the assessment
reduces the opportunities for parents to request a reassessment of the liability due to
changed circumstances.15
While the White Paper suggests that this simplified formula will promote
compliance it is by no means clear why this should be so16. On the one hand, less
information is required, but, on the other hand, the liabilities that are generated may
be less closely related to the needs of the children and the resources available to them.
For example, it seems likely that if the income of the parent with care is not sufficient
13 Chapter 2, paragraph 24.
14 The White Paper proposes that tables will be made widely available which show the liability for any
given band of non-resident parent’s income, dependent upon the number of qualifying children and the
number of children in the non-resident parent’s second family.
15 Indeed, the only apparent grounds for a reassessment are if either the number of children change or
there is a variation in the non-resident parent’s earnings of more then 5 percent.
16 The Australian child support system is similar in structure to the existing UK system in that it of the
income-shares type, and it achieves a compliance rate of more than 80%. See
http://www.csa.gov.au/scheme/FF4.DOC.
8to meet the needs of the children this would be a motivation for compliance, but this
parent’s income no longer enters the formula.
It has also been suggested that lower levels of liability will enhance
compliance, possibly because lower liabilities will be perceived as fairer by non-
resident parents.
The proposed introduction of a £10 disregard for Child Support into Income
Support assessments and the raising of the WFTC disregard from £15 to a full
disregard are also both intended to promote compliance. The enhanced disregards
give parents with care receiving Income Support or WFTC a greater financial reward
for co-operating with the CSA (those on Income Support without a Child Support
agreement already face a £20 benefit penalty for failure to co-operate without good
grounds). In addition, a NRP whose corresponding PWC is on either benefit may be
encouraged to pay (or pay more) since it increases the income available to their
children more than under the existing system.17
A second objective of the reform is to shift some of the burden of supporting
the children of lone (and some remarried) mothers from benefit payments to the non-
resident fathers, but the potential impact of the reforms on government spending on
benefit payments is ambiguous. Although any new Child Support payment above the
disregard level reduces government spending of welfare payments, the higher
disregards themselves will increase benefit spending for any already existing
payments below that level.
A third objective of the reforms is to reduce some of the work disincentives
implicit in the current Child Support formula and the benefit disregards for Child
Support. Work incentives are improved for non-resident parents through the lowering
the Child Support taper on their earnings (although the “income effect” arising from
their lower liabilities could lead to lower hours of work), while the return to working
is also improved for the non-resident parent’s new partner since the partner’s earnings
would no longer enter the formula. The incentives for the parent with care are also
improved through the removal of their income from consideration by the formula.
17 However, the enhanced disregards may increase formal Child Support payments at the cost of
reducing informal payments and payments-in-kind.
9The rationale for the current Child Support disregards in  the WFTC and
Housing Benefit programmes, but not in Income Support, is a work incentive one: by
making Child Support effectively an in-work transfer the current system aims to
promote the incentive to work. It has been explicitly recognised that the introduction
of a disregard for Income Support may be a considerable discouragement for working
for PWCs and the raising of the WFTC disregard is specifically aimed to
counterbalance this negative impact. However, the net impact can only be judged
using empirical evidence.
Finally, and as a consequence of the first three goals, it is hoped that the
reforms will ensure greater financial resources for those children most in need.
Whether the proposed reforms will help to reduce the incidence of poverty among
children depends upon a complicated interaction between changes in liabilities,
compliance and working behaviour. Lower liabilities for non-resident parents with
second families may benefit in protecting the children in these second families from
poverty. On the other hand, children living with parents with care may suffer from the
lower levels of liabilities, although the £10 Income Support disregard and improved
work incentives may help, in particular, the poorest parents with care. The White
Paper itself contains very few figures and rather crudely points out that the average
amount actually paid under the existing system with its low compliance rate would be
close to the average amount that would be expected to be paid under the new system
if compliance increased to 80%. However, the effects of the proposed reforms on
child support liabilities and their effects on the net incomes of the caring and non-
resident parents have not been investigated at all.
There are no clear-cut, a priori, conclusions on the potential outcomes of the
reforms as there are forces operating in opposing directions. Empirical evidence on
the relative sizes of these counterbalancing pressures is required to assess the likely
effects of the changes.
4. Existing Evidence
Since the 1996 welfare reforms in the US, some states have chosen systems
similar to the current system while others have chosen schemes similar to those
proposed in the reforms. These differences ought to be informative about the likely
effects of the changes, but it is too early for any quantitative analyses of the effects of
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the US changes. Some analysis of Child Support based on data that pre-dates the
Clinton welfare reform can be found in US Census Bureau (1991), Bianchi et al
(1997) and Bartfeld (1998) who all look at dissolved partnerships in US SIPP data.
Existing empirical research on the determinants of compliance provides only a
vague indication of the likely impact of difference aspects of the reform. There is
some evidence that greater enforcement resources do significantly improve
compliance. For example, Freeman and Waldfogel (1998) estimate that for every
additional $100 per non-resident father that is spent per annum on enforcement
activity, there is a 1% rise in the proportion of never-married families receiving Child
Support. However, while statistically significant, this is not a very large effect and it is
not clear that this is effective in a cost-benefit sense. In addition, the fairness of the
system may also be important. Lin (1997) uses US data that records the non-resident
fathers’ perceptions of the fairness of the Child Support award and finds that
perceived unfairness has a strong and statistically significant negative correlation with
compliance18. The proposed Income Support disregard for the UK is very similar to
the $12.50 (approximately £8) weekly disregard that was a feature of the AFDC
system (the US equivalent to Income Support for lone mothers) funded by the US
federal government from 1984 to 1996. Since 1996, each state has had the freedom to
continue to fund this exemption and many have not, despite the imposition of federal
mandated targets to increase child support compliance. There have also been a
number of US studies19 that have investigated the determinants of compliance but
none have identified a statistically significant effect of the disregard on compliance.
Evidence on the effectiveness of the existing Child Support in the UK to
promote work incentives for the UK can be found in Bingley et al (1995, 1997) and
Preston and Walker (1999). In this paper, the existing estimates of the determinants of
labour supply behaviour from that latter paper are used to simulate the impact of the
proposed reforms for the employment choices of mothers with care.
18 Lin interprets his evidence as implying that fairness would promote compliance. However,
perceptions of fairness are likely to be based on characteristics, such as altruistic attitudes, that
themselves are correlated with compliance. Thus, it is unclear that a causal connection can be inferred
fro this paper.
19 Quantitative results are available in Robins (1995), Meyer (1993), Beron (1990, 1988a, 1988b),
Garfinkel et al (1999a, 1999b), Garfinkel and Oellierich (1989), Lin (1997), and Freeman and
Waldfogel (1998).
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The evidence from the US on the potential for Child Support to reduce poverty
amongst children is fairly unambiguous. Indeed, a particular emphasis in the US
research has been the positive role for Child Support in lifting children in lone parent
headed households out of poverty, while not being sufficiently onerous to drop
children in second families into poverty. For example, US Census Bureau (1991)
finds that the mean ratio of income to household “needs” fell from 2.43 before the
father’s departure to 1.79 just 4 months after, while the share of children in poverty
increases from 18.5% to 35.5%. Other US work by Meyer and Hu (1997) and Meyer
(1995) finds that Child Support plays an important role in lifting children in lone
parent headed households out of poverty (5% fewer when one allows for Child
Support transfers) and had little effect on the poverty rates of children in second
families headed by an non-resident father. Similar findings are given in Bartfield
(1998), which looks at the ratio of income-to-poverty ratios and finds that this ratio
rose from 3.04 to 3.31 for separating fathers and fell from 3.04 to 1.63 for separating
mothers. Thus, separation resulted in a mean rise in living standards for fathers and a
dramatic fall for mothers on average. However, it is not clear whether the underlying
relationship between the economic resources available to the parent with care and
those available to the non-resident parent driving these conclusions for the US can
also be readily applied to the case of the UK. Moreover, this says nothing about
whether a Child Support system of the type proposed in the reforms is better or worse
in redistributing the resources than the current system.
5. Data
The type of data required for an analysis of the proposed Child Support
reforms is not easily available. The existing Child Support liability formula requires
extensive income information for the households of both parents, as well as
information on family structures, housing costs and other factors. In addition, in order
to compute the net incomes of both parents, information that is relevant to the
assessment of welfare payments is required. This includes data on childcare costs (for
Family Credit/WFTC and Housing Benefit) and hours of work (for Income Support
and Family Credit/WFTC). Moreover, since many separated parents may apply to the
CSA for a Child Support agreement, it is important to assess the effects of reform for
the entire potential population rather than just those for whom use of the CSA is
obligatory because of they are in receipt of welfare benefits.
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It was necessary therefore to combine information from two surveys. The
Family Resources Survey (FRS) is a continuous survey that has been in the field since
October 1992. It has a large sample size of approximately 25,000 households each
year and a response rate of approximately 70%. Since only the 1997 survey identifies
stepchildren, data on 1904 mothers-with-care (including lone mothers and those who
have repartnered) was available for this year. While all the appropriate data exists in
this latest survey, it is not possible to identify non-resident parents in the data (except
for those that are observed to pay Child Support, which provides only a censored view
of non-resident parents).20 Moreover, it is important that mothers-with-care
(henceforth MWCs) are matched appropriately with different types of non-resident
fathers (henceforth NRFs) for there are likely to be strong correlations in terms of
such factors as their likelihood of repartnership, work behaviour, wage levels and
housing costs.
In order to estimate the likely characteristics of the NRF corresponding to each
of the observed MWCs in the FRS, a second survey, the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS) was exploited. The BHPS originally surveyed approximately five
thousand households in 1991. Being a panel that follows all adults interviewed in this
first wave, the BHPS implicitly provides continuing information on both parents who
separate some time after the first wave. The drawback of this data is that it provides a
very small sample size (only 300 observations) and it may not be typical of parents
not living together in the sense that it only contains those who have recently been
married or cohabited. It therefore excludes lone mothers who have never had a
cohabiting relationship. One immediate consequence is that the proportion of NRFs
estimated to have second families is much lower than estimates from other sources
and NRFs with second families were analysed as a separate group for this reason.
However, there is little information from other sources to check the extent to
which these deficiencies induce bias in the analysis. It seems likely that this data will
give a reasonably accurate view of the correlations between the necessary information
of the parents, especially when the relationships observed in the BHPS are used to
estimate the likely characteristics of NRFs for the MWCs in the larger and more
representative FRS sample.
20 To the best of our knowledge, this is true of all of the major population surveys.
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Thus, the BHPS data is exploited to identify the correlations between the
characteristics of MWCs in the FRS and their corresponding NRFs. For example, the
correlation between the incomes of MWCs and other characteristics such as age and
Table 1: BHPS and FRS Sample Characteristics
Mothers With Care Non-Resident Fathers
BHPS FRS BHPS FRS
% with:
- 1 qualifying child
- 2 qualifying children
- 3+ qualifying children
39.7
43.0
17.3
49.1
35.0
15.9
% with youngest qualifying child:
- aged less than 5
- aged 5 to 10
- aged over 10
25.3
47.7
27.0
34.7
37.0
28.3
Average age 31.9 33.9 34.9 36.3
% left education:
- aged 16 or less
- aged 17 to 18
- aged over 18
50.9
30.3
18.8
71.0
19.7
9.4
% in London & south-east 31.1 31.7
% in housing type:
- owned/mortgage
- rented from LA/HA
- private rented
47.6
38.6
13.8
32.0
54.4
13.6
54.6
18.2
27.3
50.3
22.4
27.3
% with partner 19.3 14.0 31.0 31.8
% with step or “new” children
% with step children
% with “new” children
18.3
14.7
4.7
20.8
16.5
5.4
% working
% of partners working
48.5
71.1
45.2
81.6
82.0
52.7
79.3
51.1
Average hours:
- if working
- for working partner
25.8
46.2
27.8
47.3
47.7
35.1
46.9
35.1
If working:
- average wage
- average wage with minimum
- average estimated wage
- average estimated with minimum
6.71
6.86
6.06
6.22
6.46
6.46
9.03
9.13
9.02
9.20
If partner working:
- average wage
- average wage with minimum
7.34
7.34
8.76
8.79
6.71
6.83
5.65
6.04
Sample size 300 1904 300 1904
Notes: Step children are children of the non-resident father’s new partner but not the non-resident
father, while “new” children are children of the non-resident father and his new partner.
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education, working behaviour, and the incomes of the ex-partners can be estimated.
Similarly the relationship between the NRF’s housing costs and the extent to which
they have repartnered or have new or step children are estimated. These estimated
characteristics also allow for the observed random variation in the NRF variables.
Such simulation of the characteristics of non-resident fathers to match the lone
mothers is common practice in the US analyses with the exception of Bartfield (1998)
– a paper that uses the SIPP panel which, like BHPS, allows the partners to be
followed after partnership dissolution.
Some summary statistics for both the FRS and BHPS data are presented in
Table 1. The first three columns of figures show the observed data, while the final
column presents the results of the simulated characteristics of NRFs in the FRS data.
There are differences in the characteristics of the MWCs between the two samples,
although the basic employment and wage statistics are very similar. For example,
there are more and older qualifying children in the BHPS than the FRS while the
mothers are slightly younger and more highly educated. These differences result in
different mean characteristics for the NRFs across the two surveys: for example
BHPS mothers are: younger, more educated, and more likely to be owner occupiers.
6. Compliance
The BHPS data is also used to model compliance by estimating the
relationship between individual compliance (defined as the ratio of Child Support paid
to the Child Support liability), the level of liability, and the characteristics of the
MWC (and the estimated characteristics of the NRF). The definition of compliance is
somewhat wider than that used in the White Paper as it reflects the difference between
the sum of both formal and informal financial transfers made from the NRF to the
children relative to the amount that they would be liable for under the CSA formula.
The sample size is 199 and consists of all the observations on separated couples who
had positive Child Support liabilities in the BHPS pooled over all available years
since 1992.21 The compliance estimation contained two stages. First, the probability
of paying any Child Support at all was modelled using a Logit framework. Second, an
21 Similar estimation has been done by Beron (1990) in the US using similar methods.
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OLS regression was used to estimate the rate of compliance, conditional on paying
something.
The results are presented in Table 2. The Logit results that determine the
probability of paying anything are rather imprecise with the exception that the Child
Support liability is positively correlated with compliance. Note that this is at odds
Table 2: Compliance Estimation Using BHPS Sample
Logit Probability Model OLS for Proportion Paid
Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error
CS Liability (£ per week) 0.027 0.007 - 0.004 0.003
# of qualifying children:
- one child
- two children
- three or more children
0.657
- 0.623
-
0.612
0.552
-
- 0.071
0.042
-
0.253
0.247
-
Age of youngest child:
- less than 5
- 5 to 10
- over 10
- 0.053
0.291
-
0.733
0.518
-
0.155
0.041
-
0.341
0.238
-
MWC age:
- under 30
- 30 to 34
- over 34
0.133
0.103
-
0.659
0.491
-
- 0.670
- 0.340
-
0.306
0.234
-
MWC age left education:
- under 17
- 17 to 18
- over 18
0.277
0.384
-
0.570
0.602
-
- 0.018
0.216
-
0.267
0.260
-
MWC partner dummy 0.472 0.487 - 0.442 0.185
MWC work dummy 0.431 0.395 0.327 0.173
MWC housing type:
- owned / mortgage
- LA / HA rent
- private rent
0.155
0.191
-
0.661
0.689
-
- 0.414
- 0.545
-
0.354
0.375
-
MWC in southeast/London - 0.499 0.420 0.353 0.193
NRF age:
- under 30
- 30 to 34
- over 34
- 1.334
- 0.119
-
0.738
0.544
-
0.362
0.500
-
0.364
0.252
-
NRF work dummy 1.933 0.916 - 0.502 0.619
NRF self-employed - 1.351 0.735 - 0.072 0.326
NRF partner dummy 0.631 0.721 0.344 0.347
NRF partner work - 0.348 0.669 - 0.348 0.339
NRF second family - 0.952 0.667 - 0.165 0.298
Constant - 3.545 1.283 1.952 0.788
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.213 0.199
Number of observations 199 105
Notes: Second family refers to the presence of children (new or step) in the non-resident father’s
family. MWC refers to the mother with care and NRF to the non-resident father.
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with the hopes expressed in the White Paper that lower liabilities encourage
compliance. In addition, younger NRFs, and those not in work, are less likely to pay
any Child Support than older and working NRFs. The effect of the liability on the
level of compliance conditional on paying something, however, is not statistically
significant and is small. For the level of compliance, the ages of both the MWC and
NRF are important, as is whether the MWC is working or whether any new partner of
the MWC is working. It is noticeable that none of the variables for the NRF’s second
family are significant in the compliance estimation, although this may be due to the
small number of such second families in the sample.
These results were used to estimate the likely “current” compliance rates
facing the PWCs in FRS data.22 A comparison of these current compliance rates
(conditional on those paying anything) for the BHPS and FRS data are shown in
Figure 1. In the BHPS sample, 49.6% of those with a positive liability were found to
pay something, and those who paid anything paid an average 94% of the liability. The
estimated corresponding figures for the FRS sample were 41.9% and 87.3%.
However, the graph suggests that compliance is not a simple all-or-nothing
relationship, with a wide distribution of compliance rates, distinctly skewed to the left.
22 The compliance estimation requires a liability level to be calculated for the FRS data. The liability
level used is that calculated for the baseline scenario for the current Child Support system described in
section 7 below.
Figure 1: Compliance Rates
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To conduct the simulation work at different levels of compliance, the estimated
compliance equation was used to compute a compliance index that indicates the
propensity to comply. Parents in the FRS were then ranked from those with the
highest score to the lowest. For a compliance rate of say x%, the top x% with the
highest compliance index were then assigned to pay their full liability while the
remainder were assigned to pay nothing23. Hence, the White Paper’s 80% target is
modelled as 80% paying the full liability and 20% paying nothing.24
7. Simulation
As a baseline to judge the impact of the reforms, the level of Child Support
payments and net incomes were calculated under the current Child Support system at
current compliance levels with wages and prices indexed to 1999 levels. In addition, it
was assumed that the minimum wage legislation increases wages below the minimum
to the minimum level. Net income consists of net earnings plus calculated benefit
payments (covering Income Support, WFTC and Housing Benefit25) plus Child
Support payments for MWCs and minus the payment for NRFs. The net income
figures reported in the tables are equivalised to a single adult person so that they
roughly measure the income per person in the family. A family is deemed to be in
poverty if income is below the HBAI poverty line, indexed to the 1999 level for a
single person at £94. An approximate measure for government net revenues was
calculated as the total income tax and National Insurance receipts minus benefit
payments, grossed up by 52 to obtain an annual figure and by 1000 as the FRS is a 1
in 1000 survey.
7.1 The Potential for Poverty Reduction
One initial question which has been raised is to what extent do NRFs have the
resources to provide reasonable levels of financial support for all of their children.
Table 3 presents the employment and benefit receipt for the FRS sample under the
23 Alternative ways of defining compliance will be pursued in future work.
24 It is not clear what the 80% target precisely means. It could mean the “binary” type compliance used
here, or it could mean that everyone pays a straight 80% of their liability. This second, “proportional”,
interpretation was also analysed and the outcomes found to lie somewhere between the effects at
current compliance and the effects from the 80% binary compliance.
25 As a reasonable approximation to the observed take-up rates, we assumed full take-up for Income
Support and Housing Benefit and 65% take-up (from the FRS Family Credit information) for WFTC.
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baseline scenario. It shows that some 73.8% of MWCs are eligible for benefits,
compared to 26.4% of NRFs. In addition, only 47.3% of MWCs are in a household
where anyone works, compared to 79.5% of NRFs. Hence, it appears that NRFs may
be in a better position than the MWC to provide support.
Table 3 Current Benefit Receipt and Employment in the FRS Sample
Percentage of
Mothers with Care
Percentage of
Non-Resident Fathers
Single
- Income Support, no work
- Income Support, work
- WFTC
- not eligible for benefits, no work
- not eligible for benefits, work
45.3
3.7
19.7
5.4
13.4
15.2
0.4
-
-
52.8
Repartnered, without children
- Income Support, no work
- Income Support, 1 worker
- WFTC, 1 worker
- WFTC, 2 workers
- not eligible for benefits, 1 worker
- not eligible for benefits, 2 workers
-
-
-
-
-
-
1.8
0.1
-
-
2.7
6.4
Repartnered, with children
- Income Support, no work
- Income Support, 1 worker
- WFTC, 1 worker
- WFTC, 2 workers
- not eligible for benefits, 1 worker
- not eligible for benefits, 2 workers
2.0
0.2
2.2
0.7
1.0
6.4
3.5
0.1
4.8
0.5
5.0
6.8
Notes: The figures are estimated using the current baseline assumptions, that is, the current CS system,
WFTC with 65% take-up, a minimum wage, CS payments under current compliance, and all prices
wages and benefit levels indexed to 1999 levels. Children refers to dependent children living in the
household of the mother with care or non-resident father. By definition, there are no mothers with care
without children. Single non-resident fathers have no children in the same household. Those families
defined as income support do not contain any person working 16 or more hours and have net income
below the IS cut-off. Those families defined as WFTC contain at least one person working 16 or more
hours and have net income below the WFTC cut-off. Those families defined as not eligible for benefits
have net income in excess of the WFTC threshold if they contain one person working at least 16 hours
or have net income in excess of the IS threshold if there is no-one working at least 16 hours. For the
families of mothers with care with no-one working, the latter implies CS payments in excess of the IS
threshold.
One way of addressing this question is to ask whether the combined income of
both families can be redistributed between them to reduce the incidence of poverty -
assuming that such redistribution does not affect the total amount available. The
results of two such hypothetical redistributions are presented in Table 4, where
income is simulated under the baseline scenario. In this sample, some 29.6% of all
MWC and NRF families are in poverty if there are no Child Support payments. But
19
Child Support payments under the current system with current compliance rates serve
to reduce this to 21.3%. If the income were distributed equally between the two
households in proportion to family size, the fraction in poverty would fall to 12.3%.
If, instead of distributing the joint net incomes across the two households equally, we
ensured that just sufficient income were allocated to the smaller of the two families to
move it out of poverty and the remaining resources allocated to the larger family, this
would generate the lowest possible poverty rate of 6.2%.
Table 4: Scope for Poverty Reduction
Non-Resident Fathers
Mothers with
Care
Single Repartnered,
without children
Repartnered,
with children
All
Single ¨ 30.1
· 19.4
v 10.7
q 5.3
(60.6)
¨ 35.3
· 27.8
v 17.8
q 8.9
(9.6)
¨ 32.4
· 28.1
v 18.5
q 9.3
(17.3)
¨ 31.1
· 22.0
v 13.0
q 6.5
(87.5)
Repartnered ¨ 17.9
· 15.2
v 5.5
q 2.8
(7.8)
¨ 14.0
· 8.0
v 0
q 0
(1.3)
¨ 23.4
· 21.9
v 15.6
q 7.8
(3.4)
¨ 19.0
· 16.2
v 7.7
q 3.8
(12.5)
All ¨ 28.7
· 18.9
v 10.1
q 5.0
(68.3)
¨ 32.3
· 25.4
v 15.6
q 18.2
(11.0)
¨ 30.9
· 27.1
v 18.0
q 9.0
(20.7)
¨ 29.6
· 21.3
v 12.3
q 6.2
(100.0)
Notes:
¨ percentage of families currently in poverty with no Child Support payment
· percentage of families currently in poverty with current Child Support payment
v percentage of families in poverty if income redistributed equally
q percentage of families in poverty if income redistributed to minimize poverty
(% of mothers-with-care and non-resident fathers in each cell)
Hence, the current Child Support system makes a significant contribution to
reducing the incidence of poverty and it appears that there might be considerable
scope for further reductions. However, the second method of redistribution is
unrealistic in that it might leave the larger family with no income. Moreover, large-
scale redistribution would have an impact on the total amount of income available,
both through the adverse work incentives and the fact that benefit payments are
20
means-tested on the family basis.26 Thus, the possibilities may be severely limited by
behavioural responses. Moreover, the hypothetical redistributions suggested in these
scenarios do not use a specific formula that could be applied equally to all separated
parents. In the real world, redistribution between parents has to use a specific formula
and this limits the extent of redistribution that can take place. In particular, such a
formula needs to be based on observable characteristics. Thus, having established that
there are, in principle, sufficient resources for redistribution to make a large impact on
child poverty, below we return to the practical case on the White Paper proposals to
see their effect in practice.
7.2 Simulated effects (with labour supply fixed)
The impact of the Child Support reform is summarised in Table 5. For now, it
is assumed that work decisions are unaffected by the reforms. The table shows four
cases: the current system prior to the introduction of the minimum wage and WFTC,
the baseline scenario, the reformed system with current levels of compliance and the
reformed system with 80% compliance. The first two columns of figures in Table 5
show that the introduction of WFTC and the minimum wage have the greatest impact
for this sample in reducing the incidence of poverty among NRFs and their second
families. Indeed, the poverty rate falls from 26.4% for children living with NRFs to
21.4%. Otherwise, the effect of WFTC and the minimum wage has been limited, with
very few winners and losers.
Without any change in compliance, the Child Support reforms substantially
reduce the average payment from £35.92 to £26.27. However, the  welfare system
“cushion” ensures that the average income for MWCs is barely affected, while NRFs
see a considerable rise in their net income. The difference is made up by the taxpayer,
as annual net government revenue falls by over £800 million. But if compliance
improves to 80%, the outcome is quite different. The average Child Support payment
now rises to £40.71 and MWCs experience an average rise in net income from
£133.54 to £136.18. The child poverty rate for MWCs falls by almost 4 percentage
points. On the other hand, NRFs witness a fall in their income, with the child poverty
rate rising from 21.4% to 25.6%. Since there are 4.7 times as many children living
26 It is also true that changes in the total amount available might affect the incidence of poverty for the
“no child support” starting point.
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Table 5: Summary of the Effects of the Reforms (No Change in Behaviour)
Current CS System
FC and no
Min Wage
WFTC and
Min Wage
Reformed CS System
 with WFTC and
Minimum Wage
Current
compliance
Current
compliance
80%
compliance
Average weekly CS paid 35.49 35.92 26.27 40.71
Average weekly income:
- mothers with care
- non-resident fathers
131.74
209.28
133.54
213.49
132.89
221.97
136.18
210.50
% families in poverty:
- mothers with care
- non-resident fathers
28.1
18.3
27.2
15.4
26.8
15.3
23.3
16.4
% children in poverty:
- mothers with care
- non-resident fathers
34.5
26.4
33.4
21.4
33.8
20.6
30.1
25.6
% winners/losers:
- mothers with care
- non-resident fathers
4.1 / 19.1
1.5 / 14.6
base
base
27.2 / 26.7
45.2 / 2.8
59.9 / 22.4
32.1 / 47.9
Change in annual net govt.
revenue (£ billion) base - 0.83 - 0.00
Notes: Average weekly income is net income plus CS payments for mothers with care and minus CS
payments for non-resident fathers, equivalised to the equivalent level for a single person household.
The effects of the reformed CS system always assume WFTC and a minimum wage. 80% compliance
assumes that 80% of non-resident fathers pay the full liability while 20% pay nothing. The change in
annual net government revenue is total tax and NI revenues minus benefit payments for both the
mothers with care and the non-resident fathers, multiplied by 52, by the sample size, and by 1000 as the
FRS is a 1 in 1000 survey. Since there are 4.7 times more children living in MWCs families than in
NRFs, the overall average poverty rate among children should allow the MWC rate a 4.7 weight
MWCs as with NRFs, the overall child poverty rate falls slightly from 31.3% prior to
reform to 29.3% post-reform. The cost to the government of reform is basically
neutral if compliance improves to 80%. Clearly, any change in compliance will be
extremely important. In Figures 2 to 4, the effect of the reform on the average Child
Support payment, net incomes and child poverty rates are graphed for a range of
compliance rates. The 100% compliance points in graph 2 reflect the fall in average
liability from £57.55 under the current system to £42.47 under the reformed system.
Current compliance rates roughly correspond to the 40% compliance points and the
graph shows that compliance would need to rise to around 65% for the average
payment not to fall under reform. It also shows how increasing compliance generates
diminishing returns in increases in the average payment, due to the fact that those with
lower liabilities are less likely to comply. If increasing compliance becomes more
difficult and more costly at higher levels of compliance, there may be a clear crossing
point above which the cost outweighs the gain in payment increase.
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Figure 3 shows how little the Child Support reform or changes in compliance
will affect the average net income for MWCs. Most of the gain of rising compliance is
felt at very low levels: the first 40% of compliance increases the average income from
£122 to £132, but it only rises to £137 with complete compliance. Increasing
compliance at higher levels draws in those who, on average, have the characteristics
associated with having lower liabilities. These tend to be NRFs matched with MWCs
who are receiving benefits and derive little gain in net income from increased Child
Support payments. Moreover, at all levels of compliance, the reform generates a
change in the average income of less than £2 per week. This reflects the balancing of
two contrary forces: the fall in Child Support payments (and thereby net incomes) for
those who are not on benefits versus the increase in net income from the reformed
benefit disregards for those who are on benefits. For NRFs, net income falls steadily
as compliance increases, although at a decreasing rate, and the reforms
unambiguously increase average net income at each compliance level. The
“breakeven” level of compliance for both MWCs and NRFs is just under 60%. Below
this compliance point, MWCs experience a fall in average income relative to the
current system, while NRFs experience a gain. Above it, MWCs enjoy an average
gain while NRFs an average loss.
Figure 2          Average CS Payment
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0 20 40 60 80 100
Compliance Rate
£ 
pe
r 
w
ee
k
Current CS System Reformed CS System
23
Figure 4 shows the impact of compliance and reform on child poverty rates
and captures the impact on the lower end of the income distribution. For MWCs,
increasing compliance steadily reduces poverty under either Child Support system
until compliance reaches 60%. Thereafter, increasing compliance tends to benefit
MWCs on Income Support, who gain little under the current Child Support system but
do benefit from the disregards under the reformed system allowing increasing
compliance to reduce poverty. For NRFs, the poverty rate increases steadily with
compliance under the current Child Support scheme, but jumps sharply between 60%
and 80% compliance under the reformed scheme. Only when the most reluctant
NRFs, who are the poorest ones, are brought to comply does compliance begin to bite
on poverty. The impact of reform on non-resident fathers with second families is
discussed in more detail below.
The importance of Child Support in reducing child poverty requires a
balancing of the reduction in poverty for MWCs against the increase for NRFs. Using
the suitably weighted average, the proportion of children in poverty is 33% at zero
compliance or no Child Support payments. At current levels of compliance, the
combined poverty rate under reform is 31%, falling to 29% at 80% compliance and to
28% if all liabilities are paid. Hence, Child Support payments clearly play an
important role in lifting children out of poverty.
Figure 3: Average Income
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Table 6 considers the impact of different Income Support disregards for the
sample of MWCs potentially eligible for Income Support. It also highlights the effect
of the reforms on the main component of the CSA client group. For this group, the
effect of the reform is to reduce the average Child Support payment £22.53 to £15.76
if there is no change in compliance and to raise it to £33.87 if compliance rises to
80%. However, even in the absence of a compliance change, net income rises slightly
due to the new £10 disregard and poverty declines slightly. If compliance rises to
80%, the size of the disregard becomes very important. A £10 disregard reduces child
poverty from 49.7% to 44.3%, while the £15 disregard reduces it further to 41.9%. In
terms of net government revenue, there is a broad relationship that each 1 percentage
point reduction in child poverty achieved through the disregard costs approximately
100 million pounds a year.
The effects of the WFTC disregard on MWCs who are potentially eligible for
WFTC are presented in Table 7. The increase in the disregard from £15 to the full
Child Support payment under the proposed reforms raises average income for this
group from £130 to £133 under current compliance and from £134 to £140 under 80%
compliance, but has little impact on poverty. However, increasing WFTC take-up
from 65% to 95% (under the reform with 80% compliance) reduces the rate of child
poverty for this group from 11.3% to 4.4%.
Figure 4: Child Poverty Rates
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Table 6 Mothers With Care Potentially Eligible for IS (CSA Client Group)
Current System Reformed CS System
Current
Compliance
Current
Compliance
80%
Compliance
Average weekly CS paid 22.53 15.76 33.87
Average weekly income:
- without IS disregard
- with £10 IS disregard
- with £15 IS disregard
100.82
-
-
99.83
101.75
102.68
99.85
103.98
105.94
% families in poverty
- without IS disregard
- with £10 IS disregard
- with £15 IS disregard
42.7
-
-
43.9
40.9
40.0
43.4
36.0
33.7
% children in poverty
- without IS disregard
- with £10 IS disregard
- with £15 IS disregard
49.7
-
-
51.5
49.1
48.3
50.8
44.3
41.9
% winners / losers:
- without IS disregard
- with £10 IS disregard
- with £15 IS disregard
base
-
-
3.0 / 12.6
26.9 / 6.8
27.6 / 6.1
7.9 / 12.0
65.8 / 6.7
66.5 / 6.1
Change in net govt. revenue (£b):
- from adding £10 disregard
- from adding £15 disregard
-
-
- 0.28
- 0.42
- 0.64
- 0.94
Notes: Potentially eligible includes families eligible for Income Support and the 5% of families with
no-one working but not eligible for IS due to CS received under the baseline scenario with the current
CS system.
Table 7: Mothers with Care Eligible for WFTC
Current
System
Reformed CS System
Current
Compliance
Current
Compliance
80%
Compliance
80% Compliance
95% WFTC Takeup
Average weekly CS paid 38.48 26.57 40.21 40.32
Average weekly income:
- with £15 disregard
- with full disregard
133.44
-
129.70
132.99
134.40
140.13
143.78
149.80
% families in poverty:
- with £15 disregard
- with full disregard
11.6
-
12.0
12.0
10.6
9.2
4.0
4.0
% children in poverty:
- with £15 disregard
- with full disregard
13.3
-
14.5
14.1
13.0
11.3
4.2
4.4
% winners / losers
- with £15 disregard
- with full disregard
base
-
22.9 / 48.8
37.3 / 40.3
47.9 / 42.7
60.0 / 35.4
62.7 / 27.1
78.3 / 11.8
Change in annual net
govt. revenue due to the
full disregard (£ billion)
- - 0.53 - 0.95 - 1.01
Notes: Mothers with care eligible for WFTC are those eligible under the baseline scenario with the
current CS system. WFTC take-up is currently estimated as 65% of those eligible.
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One final area of special interest is the impact of the reform on NRFs with
second families. A separate analysis for this group is presented in Table 8. Average
Child Support payments fall from £20.58 to £13.31 with reform if compliance is
unchanged, but rise to £32.72 if compliance rises to 80%. Correspondingly, average
income rises from £150 to £153 with no change in compliance and falls to £145 with
improved compliance. Child poverty declines only slightly if compliance is
unchanged, but rises from 21.4% to 25.6% (as shown in Table 1) if compliance rises.
Because low income NRFs with second families are currently exempt from any
minimum payment, concern has been expressed that they might be particularly
adversely affected by the new £5 minimum proposed in the reforms. However, this
Table 8  Impact of Reform on Non-Resident Fathers with Second Families
Current CS System Reformed CS System
Current
Compliance
Current
Compliance
80%
Compliance
Average weekly CS paid:
- current or full reforms
- reform without £5 minimum
- reform excluding step children
20.58
-
-
13.31
13.31
15.75
32.72
32.60
39.71
Average weekly income:
- current or full reforms
- reform without £5 minimum
- reform excluding step children
149.75
-
-
153.00
153.00
151.96
144.90
144.96
142.00
% families in poverty:
- current or full reforms
- reform without £5 minimum
- reform excluding step children
19.1
-
-
18.6
18.6
18.8
23.2
23.2
24.7
% children in poverty:
- current or full reforms
- reform without £5 minimum
- reform excluding step children
21.4
-
-
20.6
20.6
21.0
25.6
25.6
27.4
% winners / losers
- current or full reforms
- reform without £5 minimum
- reform excluding step children
base
-
-
25.3 / 1.5
25.3 / 1.5
24.2 / 2.6
17.0 / 55.7
17.0 / 53.1
14.2 / 58.5
Change in annual net govt.
revenue (£ b) due to:
- £5 minimum
- including step children
-
-
0
- 0.08
0
- 0.40
Notes: Second family refers to the presence of children (new or step) in the non-resident father’s
family. The reform without a £5 minimum payment assumes that non-resident fathers with net income
below £100 a week pay no CS. The reform excluding step children assumes that non-resident fathers
can only deduct an initial proportion of their net income for new children and not for step children
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minimum payment has virtually no effect on the second families in this sample
studied here. The analysis also considered the effect of the inclusion of stepchildren in
the NRFs allowance for children in a second family. The inclusion of stepchildren
reduces the average Child Support payment by around £2 under current compliance
and £7 under 80% compliance, but has a relatively small impact on net incomes and
poverty rates. The inclusion costs the government around 80 million pounds a year
under current compliance and 400 million pounds under 80% compliance.
7.3 Simulated effects with labour supply variable
The effect of the reform on employment choices is also analysed. The
simulated labour supply effects are based on estimates of a discrete choice model of
labour market status that models the probabilities of each individual being a full-time
worker, part-time worker, and a non-participant as a function of observed
characteristics (whether the youngest child is in one of three age ranges) and the net
incomes that individuals would expect to command in each status. The modelling
assumes a specific form for preferences that correspond to a labour supply function
that would be linear in the net wage rate and the level of unearned income. The
methodology is outlined in Moffitt (1984) and allows the recovery of estimates of the
parameters of individual preferences over hours of work and net income. These
parameters permit the probabilities of choosing each labour market state to be
simulated using the calculated net incomes in each state and the number of children in
each age range. Using estimates from Preston and Walker (1999), based on the 1994
Family Expenditure Survey, the employment outcomes for MWCs27 can be simulated
for the 1997 FRS data, both for the existing system and for any alternative welfare
and Child Support systems chosen.
Apart from being based on an earlier and smaller dataset the estimates suffer
from three important deficiencies. First, they assume that unobservable characteristics
associated with participating in welfare programmes, for example self-confidence, are
uncorrelated with labour market status. That is, Family Credit participation is assumed
to be statistically exogenous. This is potentially important in the context of
participation in Family Credit where the programme participation rate is significantly
27 Since male labour supply is generally held to be inelastically supplied (see Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999)), ignoring the effect of Child Support on the NRFs’ labour supplies seems reasonable.
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less than 100% and the estimates reported in Bingley and Walker (1997) suggest that
this correlation is statistically significant28. Secondly, the unobservable characteristics
associated with being in receipt of child support, for example assertiveness, are also
assumed to be uncorrelated with labour market status. There is no UK evidence on
this issue but Hu (1999), using US data, suggests that there may be such a correlation.
Finally, the estimates assume that all that matters for determining labour
market status choices is the levels of net income corresponding to each choice and not
the composition of that net income. Thus, welfare payments may well be a more
reliable source of income than earnings and, in particular, more reliable than Child
Support payments from the ex-partner29. In which case behaviour may be expected to
be more sensitive to a given variation in welfare entitlements than to the same
variation in net income resulting from Child Support changes. Similarly welfare
payments may be stigmatised so that £1 of welfare is not worth the same, to the
household, as a £1 of earned income or child support and hence would have a smaller
effect on behaviour. The UK evidence on this in Bingley and Walker (1999) also
suggests that the simple assumptions embodied in the Preston and Walker estimates
are unlikely to be true: behaviour does appear to be significantly affected by the
source of income as well as its level.
Thus, the estimates used here are unlikely to be unbiased and therefore the
resulting simulations should be regarded as indicative rather than definitive. However,
while these estimates are suspect, theoretical considerations give no clues as to either
the direction or magnitude of the bias. Moreover, the technical difficulties associated
with dealing with these sources of bias are considerable and this is likely to require
more detailed data than is currently available. Thus, until such data is available, these
estimates are the only ones available in the UK literature that allow us to simulate
behaviour by making explicit comparisons of household welfare in different labour
market states.
One important point to note in this analysis is that the modelling that allows
for behavioural change is based on predicted wages, that is wages that we expect
individuals to be able to command in the labour market as predicted by an estimated
28 See also work by Keane and Moffitt (1998) for US data.
29 See Jenkins and Millar (1984).
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equation that relates the wages of workers with their observed characteristics30. Thus,
the levels in the tables below are not strictly comparable with the earlier ones.
However, the changes across rows are broadly comparable across the two sections.
A summary of the impact of Child Support reform allowing for a work
response by MWCs, is presented in Table 9. Note that the inclusion of labour supply
effects does not alter the Child Support payment under the reformed system so that
the income outcomes for the NRPs are unaltered from the analysis with fixed labour
supply and need not be repeated in this section.
Table 9       Summary of the Effects of the Reforms on Employment Responses
Current CS System
FC and no
Min Wage
WFTC and
Min Wage
Reformed CS System
(WFTC and Min Wage)
Current
compliance
Current
compliance
80%
compliance
Average weekly CS paid 36.44 36.59 26.27 40.71
% of mothers with care:
- not working
- working part-time
- working full-time
57.5
22.0
20.5
56.2
22.7
21.2
55.1
23.3
21.6
53.3
25.3
21.4
Average weekly income:
- mothers with care
- non-resident fathers
130.48
212.81
132.93
212.88
133.48
221.97
138.55
210.50
% families in poverty:
- mothers with care
- non-resident fathers
20.5
15.7
19.0
15.3
18.6
15.3
15.8
16.4
% children in poverty:
- mothers with care
- non-resident fathers
26.7
23.7
25.0
21.0
24.2
20.6
21.3
25.6
% winners / losers:
- mothers with care
- non-resident fathers
8.0 / 26.0
3.3 / 3.8
base
base
30.2 / 27.6
45.7 / 2.4
60.1 / 22.5
32.3 / 47.7
Change in annual net govt.
revenue (£ billion)
base - 0.99 - 0.30
Notes: The estimated employment choice for the mother with care is modelled as a discrete choice
between not working (0 hour), part-time work (16 hours) and full-time work (37 hours). The
employment choice for the non-resident father is assumed unchanged.
30 It turns out that there is some “negative selectivity” in our results, that is, the predicted wages of non-
workers are higher than for those observed to work. This finding in not uncommon in the UK literature,
but it is something deserving of further research.
30
Using the estimated labour supply behaviour, 56.2% of MWCs are predicted
not to be working under the baseline scenario of the current Child Support system,
while 22.7% work part-time and 21.2% work full-time. Prior to reform, the child
poverty rate is estimated to be 25.0%. Table 10 shows the impact of the Child Support
reforms on these work choices at current compliance levels and at 80% compliance. It
also shows the effects of variations in the Child Support disregards for Income
Support, WFTC and Housing Benefit, as well as the consequence of an increase in
WFTC take-up from 65% to 95%. Table 11 presents the corresponding figures for
MWC child poverty rates and government revenues. The top three rows in each table
show the impact of reform variations which may reduce the propensity to work for
MWCs, while the bottom four rows show variations which enhance working.
If compliance is unchanged, the proposed package of reforms would slightly
increase the proportions of MWCs working both part-time and full-time, reducing the
fraction not working from 56.2% to 55.1%. If compliance rises to 80%, the proportion
not working declines to 53.3% and over a quarter of MWCs now work part-time. In
contrast to the case where employment is unchanged (see Table 5), child poverty for
MWCs is estimated to fall even if compliance does not improve, showing how MWCs
at the lower end of the income distribution may adjust their working behaviour to
offset adverse income effects. The employment response also raises the net cost of the
reform for government revenues: from £830 to £990 million pounds a year if
compliance is unchanged, or from zero to £30 million if compliance improves to 80%.
Holding the WFTC disregard at the current level of £15 would result in a
negative impact on employment choices from the reform, while the full disregard also
serves to slightly reduce poverty among MWC children. On the other hand, the
introduction of the £10 Income Support disregard reduces the proportion of working
MWCs by 2-3 percentage points, mostly to the detriment of part-time work. This
adverse employment response is partly responsible for the relatively small impact that
the disregard now has on poverty. The introduction of a full disregard for Housing
Benefit has a theoretically ambiguous impact on work incentives, but is found to
increase part-time work at the expense of both not working and working full-time. It
has little effect on poverty, but costs government revenue between £20 million a year
and £36 million, depending upon compliance changes.
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Table 10 Impact of Compliance and Benefit Disregards on Mother with
Care’s Employment
Current Compliance:
Percentage of MWCs:
80% Compliance:
Percentage of MWCs:
Policy:
No
Work
Part
Time
Full
Time
No
Work
Part
Time
Full
Time
Raise IS disregard to £15 and
reduce WFTC disregard to £15 59.3 19.1 21.6 57.1 22.0 20.9
Reduce WFTC disregard to £15 58.3 19.8 21.9 56.0 23.0 21.1
Raise IS disregard to £15 56.0 22.5 21.5 54.7 24.0 21.3
Baseline Reform:
IS disregard = £10
WFTC disregard = full
HB disregard = £15
WFTC take-up = 65%
55.1 23.3 21.6 53.3 25.3 21.4
Raise HB disregard to full 53.7 25.4 20.9 50.8 29.3 20.0
Reduce IS disregard to £0 53.2 25.0 21.9 50.0 27.9 22.1
Raise WFTC take-up to 95% 51.8 30.8 17.5 49.4 33.7 16.9
Raise HB disregard to full,
reduce IS disregard to £0, raise
WFTC take-up to 95%
48.7 34.8 16.6 43.3 42.0 14.7
Table 11 Impact of Employment Responses on Mother with Care’s Income
and Poverty and Government Revenure
Percentage of MWC
Children in Poverty
Impact on Government
Revenue (£ b)
Policy
Current
Compliance
80%
Compliance
Current
Compliance
80%
Compliance
Raise IS disregard to £15 and
reduce WFTC disregard to £15 25.7 21.5 - 0.72 + 0.06
Reduce WFTC disregard to
£15
25.8 22.4 - 0.61 + 0.24
Raise IS disregard to £15 24.1 20.7 - 1.06 - 0.47
Baseline Reform:
IS disregard = £10
WFTC disregard = full
HB disregard = £15
WFTC take-up = 65%
24.2 21.3 - 0.99 - 0.30
Raise HB disregard to full 24.1 21.1 - 1.19 - 0.66
Reduce IS disregard to £0 24.6 22.6 - 0.83 + 0.04
Raise WFTC take-up to 95% 21.7 18.5 - 1.60 - 0.98
Raise HB disregard to full and
reduce IS disreagrd to £0 and
raise WFTC take-up to 95%
21.9 18.8 - 1.76 - 1.25
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An alternative means for enhancing employment participation and reducing
poverty is an increase in the WFTC take-up rate. Indeed, if the dual behavioural
responses of increasing compliance to 80% and raising WFTC take-up to 95% were
achieved with the introduction of Child Support reforms, the proportion of non-
workers among MWCs is estimated to fall from 56.2% to 49.4%, while those working
part-time would rise from 22.7% to 33.7%. The drawback is that the proportion
working full-time is estimated to fall from 21.2% to 16.9%. Such a change would also
be very costly to government revenue.
8. Conclusions
This analysis shows that Child Support payments do play an important role in
lifting the children living in first families out of poverty. Moreover, the evidence
suggests that Child Support does not raise the risk of poverty amongst the children of
second families living with non-resident fathers to anywhere near the extent that it
lowers the risk for children in first families. The reforms proposed in the White Paper
could eliminate some of the perverse features of the existing Child Support system
and would reduce the computational demands on the CSA to allow existing resources
to be redeployed towards compliance activity. But the White Paper makes no attempt
to substantiate the extent to which these changes would promote the welfare of
children.
One of the main conclusions from this analysis is that changes in compliance
are going to be very important for the impact of the proposed Child Support reform on
net incomes, poverty rates and the cost of the reform to the government. Yet very little
evidence to make an informed estimate of the likely changes in compliance. Indeed,
the White Paper’s target of 80% is not an estimate but a figure that is driven by the
reform being required to ensure that the impact on government revenue is neutral. It is
not, in any way, founded on concrete empirical evidence concerning the determinants
of compliance.
Based on a sample using survey data on all parents living separately and
assuming no employment responses, our analysis suggests that 80% compliance is
indeed about the level required for a revenue neutral package. However, only 60%
compliance is the breakeven point for income and poverty outcomes. Below this
point, average income for mothers with care falls with the implementation of the
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reform, while above this point, average incomes and child poverty rates for the non-
resident fathers fall below the levels under the current system. The child poverty rates
for mothers with care are likely to be reduced by reform as long as there is a
reasonable improvement in compliance.
Our analysis suggests that it is unlikely that any group will be substantially
adversely affected by the reforms, within the plausible range of compliance changes.
There are no large increases in poverty rates or dramatic falls in average net incomes
under any compliance outcome, thanks, in part, to the cushioning effect of the benefit
system. The Income Support disregard is particularly instrumental in protecting
mothers with care against poverty, although the corresponding work disincentive
could substantially mitigate the effectiveness of this protection. Overall, the proposed
entire package of reforms is unlikely to have any large adverse consequences for
employment behaviour and may even raise participation rates. This is especially
reassuring in light of the theoretical possibility that the negative impact of the Income
Support disregard could have outweighed the positive effect from the increased
WFTC disregard. Increases in WFTC take-up could be an alternative means of raising
employment participation and reducing poverty, although there are costs in terms of
full-time employment and government revenue.
The degree of certainty about the potential effects of any reforms to the Child
Support system is severely limited by a lack of empirical evidence on how different
elements of any system affect compliance, employment responses and household
formation. The White Paper could provide an opportunity to discover what works
effectively, but only if it is implemented in such a way which allows useful
evaluation. For example, randomising the size of the Income Support disregard would
allow the identification of both compliance and labour supply effects. Staggering the
implementation might also help to introduce an “experimental” element to the reform.
Naturally, improved data would be required to assess the implications of these effects
and the regular statistical work of the CSA could play an important role. Moreover,
only minor changes in the FRS are required to allow us to identify non-resident
parents and we regard this as an essential pre-requisite to effective evaluation. A more
ambitious extension to FRS would be to match parents with care and non-resident
parents.
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Regardless of the policy choices made in this current round of reform, both
further research and the evaluation of the implementation of reforms are essential to
enhance our understanding of how to create a fair and workable Child Support system
which best provides an adequate standard of living for the children involved.
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